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ABSTRACT

For scholars of international law and international dispute resolution,
the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact and
Agreement may seem a mixed blessing. On the one hand, they promise
environmental cooperation and management of the Great Lakes at an unprecedented scale. The agreements have been heralded as a tremendous
advancement in state-provincial relations. On the other hand, international
scholars should be nervous for what the agreements signify for international
law and dispute resolution. The Compact and Agreement are remarkable
for replacing an already functioning regulatory regime: the 1909 Boundary
Waters Treaty, administered by the International Joint Commission (IJC).
This Article does not criticize the agreements, but it does lament the
reluctance of the United States and Canada to more readily embrace the IJC,
* Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School. J.D., Columbia University, 1997; B.A., University of Washington, 1994. The author is the Director of Southwestem's Summer Law Program in Vancouver, B.C., Canada, where he teaches international
environmental law at the University of British Columbia. The author is grateful to Noah Hall
for his comments and suggestions and to Clinton Hare and Natasha Hill for their research
assistance.
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and the powers granted to it under the Boundary Waters Treaty. The Compact and Agreement move transboundary environmental management and
dispute resolution from the international to the sub-national level. By doing
so, they likely will further curtail the two countries' use of the IJC. At the
very least, the agreements reflect a missed opportunity to reinvigorate,
rather than undermine, the IJC. If the IJC has been only marginally effective recently, its shortcomings are a result of U.S. and Canadian national
policy. The federal governments have been reluctant to embrace the IJC as
an effective bilateral institution. It did not have to be this way. The result,
this Article concludes, is unfortunate.
INTRODUCTION

For scholars of international law and international dispute resolution,
the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact and
Agreement' may seem a mixed blessing. On the one hand, the Compact and
Agreement should be praised. For decades, greater state-provincial cooperation over Great Lakes management has been sought.2 The Compact and
Agreement realizes that goal and promises environmental cooperation and
management of the world's largest surface freshwater system 3 at an unprecedented scale. The agreements together ambitiously establish: (1) a
virtual ban on water diversions; (2) a basin-wide environmental standard for
water use; and (3) increased conservation measures.' For these and other
measures, scholars proclaim the agreements to be a "tremendous advance-

1. Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Dec. 13,
2005, http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-05/GreatLakes-StLawrenceRiver_
BasinWaterResourcesCompact.pdf [hereinafter 2005 Great Lakes Compact]; Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement, Dec. 13, 2005,
http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-05/GreatLakes-StLawrence_RiverBasin_
SustainableWaterResourcesAgreement.pdf [hereinafter 2005 Great Lakes Agreement].
2. See, e.g., Marcia Valiante, The Great Lakes CharterAnnex 2001: Legal Dimensions of ProvincialParticipation,13 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 47 (2003) [hereinafter Valiante,
CharterAnnex]; Chris A. Shafer, Great Lakes DiversionsRevisited: Legal Constraintsand
Opportunitiesfor State Regulation, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 461 (2000); Steven M. Siros,
TransboundaryPollution in the GreatLakes: Do Individual States Have Any Role to Play in
Its Prevention?,20 S.ILL. U. L.J. 287 (1996); David J. Allee, SubnationalGovernance and
the International Joint Commission: Local Management of United States and Canadian
Boundary Waters, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 133 (1993).
3.

GREAT LAKES COMM'N, TOWARD A WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT DECISION

SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR THE GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN 9 (2003). The Great
Lakes contain twenty percent of the world's fresh surface water and ninety-five percent of
North America's fresh surface water.
4. 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 1, § 1.3; 2005 Great Lakes Agreement,
supra note 1, art. 100.
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ment" in environmental protection.' At the very least, they reinforce the
long-held, almost romantic, belief6 that a unique Canadian-U.S. talent exists
for bilateral cooperation and dispute resolution.'
On the other hand, some scholars may have a more muted response.
The Compact and Agreement are remarkable for replacing an already functioning regulatory regime that the International Joint Commission (IJC)
administers: the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty The Compact and Agreement transfer oversight of Great Lakes water diversions from the IJC to the
states and provinces. They create dispute resolution processes, not in an
international body, but in a Council consisting of regional state and provincial leaders. They permit enforcement through private citizen suits. In

5. Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 435 (2006) [hereinafter Hall,
Horizontal Federalism]; see also Noah Hall, MidWest Region Report: Governors Reach
Agreement on Great Lakes Water Compact - ProposalNow Goes to State Legislature for
Approval, 9 No. 1 A.B.A. WATER RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL. 9 (2006) (describing the
Compact as "a major advancement in both the substantive legal rules for water use in the
Great Lakes basin and the cooperative management among the states and provinces that
share this resource"); Eight US. Great Lake States, Ontario, and Quebec Conclude New
Agreements to Limit Diversions of Waterfrom GreatLakes Basin, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 467,
468 (John R. Crook ed., 2006) [hereinafter Diversions] (describing the agreements as providing "unprecedented protections" for the Great Lakes Basin); Marcia Valiante, Harmonization
of Great Lakes Water Management in the Shadow of NAFTA, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
525, 526 (2004) (describing Annex 2001, the precursor to the Compact and Agreement, as
"an important attempt to develop for the first time a comprehensive water management regime that is coordinated among the ten Basin jurisdictions") [hereinafter Valiante, Harmonization of GreatLakes].
6. Richard B. Bilder, Working Paper 8:4, When Neighbors Quarrel: Canada-US.
Dispute-Settlement Experience 3-4 (May 1987) ("[I]n a world in which it sometimes seems
that each country is at odds with every other, the Canada-U.S. relationship has sometimes
looked like an island of tranquility in a sea of conflict.... [T]he idea [being] that Canada and
the U.S. had somehow developed a magic formula for achieving a happy international marriage.").
7. Id.(describing the uniqueness of the Canada-U.S. relationship for dispute resolution); see also KARl ROBERTS, A CONTINENTAL DIVIDE? RETHINKING THE CANADA-U.S.
BORDER RELATIONSHIP 2 (2006), http://www.cwf.caabcalcwf/doc.nsf/(Publications)/FA47E
7AA8D6604C0872571A8004995BD/$file/A%2OContinental%2ODivide.pdf (noting that the
Canadian-U.S. relationship is often "hailed internationally as a model for cooperative issue
resolution"); Erik B. Wang, Adjudication of Canada-UnitedStates Disputes, 19 CAN. Y.B.
INT'L L. 158, 159 (1981) (citing Marcel Cadieux, Sixth Annual Conference of the Canadian
Council on InternationalLaw, Ottawa, October 21, 1977, 1 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 19 (1978) (describing the historic ability of countries to resolve disputes, but questioning whether that era
has ended)).
8. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to the Boundary
Waters Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 [hereinafter 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty].
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short, to a significant extent, the agreements move transboundary environmental management and dispute resolution to the sub-national level. 9
This ambivalence to the Compact and Agreement should not be interpreted as criticism. The state and provincial leaders who signed the agreements did so because they perceived them as necessary. Canada historically
has left environmental protection largely to the provinces." In the last decade, the U.S. federal government has retreated from rigorous federal environmental protection" and seems less inclined to tackle transboundary problems with Canada.' The IJC is in disfavor and has lost much of its political
effectiveness. 3 In this context, the states and provinces understandably
have explored "new options for managing regional resources and environmental problems that cross political boundaries."' 4 But the result is disconcerting, at least for those who see international and bilateral institutions as
the more desirable method of resolving internationaldisputes. Viewed in
this light, the Compact and Agreement is a somewhat strained, if not awk9. Valiante, CharterAnnex, supra note 2, at 53 ("What is unique [about events
leading up to the Compact and Agreement] is that they represent first steps in the development of a geographically defined governance regime at the sub-national level."); Dan Tarlock, Five Views of the Great Lakes and Why They Might Matter, 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 21,
25-26 (2006) (explaining how the countries "have been trying to develop an effective binational regulatory regime for the lakes despite the fact that a functioning regulatory regime
already exists-the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, administered by the IJC." (footnote omitted)).
10. William R. MacKay, CanadianFederalism and the Environment, 17 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REv. 25, 46-50 (2004) (describing collaborative federalism and how federalprovincial diplomacy shapes environmental policy in Canada); Neil Hawke, CanadianFederalism and EnvironmentalProtection, 14 J. ENvTL. L. 185 (2002) (describing environmental
protection in Canada and the roles of the federal and provincial governments).
11. Robert V. Percival, EnvironmentalFederalism:HistoricalRoots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1142-46, 1165-70 (1995) (noting the shift towards state
control of environmental issues); see also Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 719, 721-22, 798-801 (2006) (arguing that the current federal system "hinders the capacity" of both state and federal governments to protect the environment and
noting the unwillingness of the federal government to advance environmental goals).
12. For a general discussion, see Shi-Ling Hsu and Austen Parrish, Litigating Canada-US. TransboundaryHarm: InternationalEnvironmental Lawmaking and the Threat of
ExtraterritorialReciprocity (forthcoming 2007) (on file with authors). Joseph L. Sax &
Robert B. Keiter, The Realities of Regional Resource Management: Glacier National Park
andIts Neighbors Revisited, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 298 (2006) ("[Clurrent relations between
the United States and Canada are at a low ebb owing to other high profile issues: the United
States's embargo of Canadian cattle due to mad cow disease concerns; the United States's
embargo of softwood lumber (which has a particular impact on B.C.); Canada's refusal to
support the Iraq War with troops; proposed oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
(which Canada opposes); tightening U.S. border control policies in the wake of the 9/11
terrorist attacks; and continuing disagreements over Pacific Ocean salmon harvest levels.").
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. Hall, HorizontalFederalism,supra note 5, at 406.
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ward, domestic approach, cobbled together to avoid difficult constitutional
problems, but not fully equipped to solve the transboundary challenges the
two countries face.5
This Article explores the implications of the Compact and Agreement
for international dispute resolution between Canada and the United States
and suggests that the agreements may reflect an end of an era of IJC influence. At the very least, the agreements represent a missed opportunity to
reinvigorate, rather than undermine, the IJC. The Compact and Agreement
reflect the now conventional wisdom that nonstate actors have a central role
to play in international law, as well as the governments' reluctance to more
readily embrace international institutions. The IJC's recent shortcomings
are a result of U.S. and Canadian national policy.16 It did not have to be this
way. And that, this Article concludes, is unfortunate.
I. THE COMPACT AND AGREEMENT

The Great Lakes Compact and Agreement were concluded one year
ago, in December 2005." The agreements focus on water diversions and
broadly aim to do two things. First, they ban, with narrow exceptions,18 new
or increased water diversions to areas both inside and outside of the Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin. 9 The Compact broadly defines the relevant waters to include all "ground or surface water contained within the
Basin. ' 20 Second, the agreements spell out standards for conserving and

15. See Shafer, supra note 2, at 475-77 (discussing some of the Constitutional problems that faced the states and provinces in entering the agreement); see also Tarlock, supra
note 9, at 37-39 (describing the legal challenges to negotiate a binding mechanism to regulate
Great Lakes diversions); Valiante, Charter Annex, supra note 2 (describing the legal challenges facing Ontario and Quebec in adopting the proposed Compact and Agreement).
16. Stephan Toope & Jutta Brunrde, Freshwater Regimes: The Mandate of the
InternationalJoint Commission, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L,273, 276 (1998) ("The IJC will
only be as strong and as effective as the Canadian and U.S. governments allow it to be.").
17. Diversions, supra note 5, at 467. The Governors of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin and the Premiers of Ontario and
Qudbec approved the Compact and Agreement.
18. 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 1, § 4.9 (listing exceptions to prohibited
diversions).
19. Id. § 4.8 ("All New or Increased Diversions are prohibited, except as provided
for in [the Compact]."); 2005 Great Lakes Agreement, supra note 1, art. 200 (prohibiting
diversions and creating a management system for regulation of withdrawals); see also Hall,
Horizontal Federalism,supra note 5, at 435-44 (describing in detail the agreements); Richard F. Ricci et al., Battles over Eastern Water, 21 A.B.A. NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 38, 4142 (2006) (summarizing the key provisions of the Compact and Agreement).
20. 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 1, § 1.2; see Hall, Horizontal Federalism, supra note 5, at 435 (explaining the significance of this definition and describing it as "a
long overdue advancement in water law").
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managing the Great Lakes' waters. 2' They require each state or province to
adopt a set of "environmentally-based common standards into its domestic
regulatory regime. 22 These "standards represent numerous advances in the
development of water use law, including uniform treatment for ground and
surface water withdrawals, water conservation, return flow, and prevention
of environmental impacts. 23 The standards will be reviewed every five
years.24 If the Compact proceeds through the eight state legislatures and the
U.S. Congress, it will become binding law.25
The methods for enforcing and administering the Compact are ambitious. The Compact places enforcement power in the hands of a Council,
consisting of governors from the eight states.2 6 The Council "can promulgate and enforce rules to implement its duties."27 It has "broad authority to
plan, conduct research, prepare reports on water use, and forecast water
levels. '2' The Council also has the power to conduct investigations and
institute court actions. 29 The Compact permits enforcement lawsuits in both
state and federal court:
Any Party or the Council may initiate actions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Compact, and the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder by
the Council. Jurisdiction over such actions is granted to the court of the relevant
Party, as well as the United States District Courts for the30District of Columbia and
the District Court in which the Council maintains offices.

Recognizing that disagreements may arise occasionally, the agreements also provide for "broad and comprehensive' '31 dispute resolution procedures. Beyond a general agreement to engage in alternative dispute resolution,32 the Compact also provides for public participation, consultation,
and negotiation.3 3 If acts taken pursuant to the Compact cause harm, ag-

21.
2005 Great Lakes Compact, supranote 1, art. 4.
22. Valiante, CharterAnnex, supra note 2, at 47.
23. Hall, HorizontalFederalism,supra note 5, at 406.
24. 2005 Great Lakes Compact,supra note 1, § 3.4.
25. Id.§ 9.4; see also Hall, Horizontal Federalism,supra note 5, at 445 (describing
how, once ratified, the Compact will be difficult to terminate or amend).
26. 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 1, §§ 2.1-.9, 3.1-.4; see also id.§ 4.5
(describing how the Council will consider Regional Review findings made by representatives
of states and provinces).
27. Hall, Horizontal Federalism, supra note 5, at 444; 2005 Great Lakes Compact,
supra note 1,§§ 2.1-.3, 3.3.
28. Hall, Horizontal Federalism,supra note 5, at 444.
29. 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 1, § 7.3.
30. Id. § 7.3(2).
31. Hall, Horizontal Federalism,supra note 5,at 444.
32. Id.§ 7.2(1).
33. Id.§ 5.1 (requiring consultation with federally recognized Tribes); Id § 6.2
(setting forth procedures for public participation).
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grieved persons are "entitled to a hearing" governed by state law.34 After
exhaustion of administrative remedies, individuals also have the right to
judicial review in the U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia, or in
the district where the Council of Governors maintains its offices.35 The
right to judicial review may be one of the greatest advancements, or at least
surprises, of the Compact.
The Compact and Agreement have been widely viewed as advancement.36 The preexisting regulatory regime had grown to have significant
political limitations, while the "mechanisms in place for managing proposals to export [water] from the Basin were inadequate."37 Many viewed the
patchwork of federal, regional, and local laws that governed water diversions from the Great Lakes prior to the Compact and Agreement as ineffective.3" Indeed, in the late 1990s, proposals for large-scale water diversions
from the lakes "touched a deep anxiety within the Great Lakes Basin over
the security of regional waters and re-ignited fears within Canada over the
vulnerability of its water resources."39

34. Id. § 7.3(1).
35. Id.
36. See authorities cited supra note 5, (praising Compact and Agreement as major
advancements).
37. Valiante, CharterAnnex, supranote 2, at 48.
38. Hall, Horizontal Federalism, supra note 5, at 408, 416-32 (describing the
Boundary Waters Treaty, the Supreme Court's landmark decision regarding Chicago's diversion of Great Lakes water in Wisconsin v. Illinois, the original Great Lakes Basin Compact,
the Great Lakes Charter of 1985, various state legal regimes, the federal 1986 Resources
Development Act, and the 2001 Great Lakes Charter Annex); see also Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles over Rivers. The Southeastern States and the Struggle over the
'Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 828, 850-64 (2005) (describing the "complex amalgam of
international agreements, federal statutes, judicial decrees, and interstate (and interprovincial) compacts" that regulate use of Great Lakes waters); Valiante, Harmonization of
Great Lakes, supra note 5, at 525 (noting that "[p]roposals to take water out of the Great
Lakes have a long and controversial history that led to the development of a complex web of
treaty obligations, domestic legislation, judicial oversight and sub-national agreements");
Siros, supra note 2, at 287 (explaining that in "a relatively small area, many different regulatory and media systems collide, creating wide ranging environmental control problems").
39. Valiante, Charter Annex, supra note 2, at 48, 53-55 (describing the 1998 proposal to allow Nova Group to take water from Lake Superior and export it by tankers to
Asia); see also Tarlock, supra note 9, at 22 (noting that "fears about future in-basin consumptive uses and transbasin diversions have been a major political and legal issue in the
basin for more than two decades"); Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce
Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 20-22 (2003) (describing public outcry after the 1998
Nova Group proposal and 2001 Perrier water proposal to divert water from the Great Lakes).
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II. THE END OF AN ERA?

The Compact and Agreement, however, are by no means the first attempt to protect the Great Lakes from large-scale diversions.4" The two
countries have sought to protect the resource for more than a century. Indeed, the agreements are striking because they supplant, and largely ignore,
an existing comprehensive international regulatory regime.
A. The Boundary Waters Treaty and the IJC
Bi-national management and cooperation of the Great Lakes began
over a hundred years ago. In the early 1900s, several projects were proposed to divert waters from the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin.4 At the
time, boundary waters were a "significant political irritant" for the two
countries, with disputes over not only water diversions but also navigation
and power generation.42 The tension in Canada-U.S. relations led to the
creation of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty.43
The Boundary Waters Treaty was the first international water rights
treaty not focused directly on navigation." Although the treaty's negotia40. Shafer, supra note 2, at 465-67 (describing history of Great Lakes diversions and
diversion proposals).
41. See generally William L. Griffin, Great Lakes Diversions and Consumptive
Uses in HistoricalInternationalLegal Perspective, 75 MICH. B.J. 62, 62-67 (1996) (describing events leading up to adoption of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty); see also Valiante,
Harmonizationof Great Lakes, supra note 5, at 527 (sketching the development of the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty); Daniel K. DeWitt, Note, Great Words Needed for the Great
Lakes: Reasons to Rewrite the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, 69 IND. L.J. 299, 300-08
(1993) (detailing the history of the Boundary Waters Treaty in connection with the Great
Lakes); Jennifer Woodward, Note, InternationalPollution Control: The United States and
Canada-TheInternationalJoint Commission, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325, 32628 (1988) (describing enactment of the Boundary Waters Treaty).
42. Toope & Brunnde, supra note 16, at 277; see also N.F. Dreisziger, Dreams and
Disappointments, in THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON 10-11
(Robert Spencer et al. eds., 1981) (describing early transboundary disputes involving water
diversions); Richard Kyle Paisley et al., Transboundary Water Management: An Institutional
Comparison Among Canada,the United States, and Mexico, 9 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 177,
181-83 (2004) (describing the "growing water related disputes between Canada and the
United States" at the beginning of the twentieth century and the development of the Boundary Waters Treaty).
43.
1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8.
44. See Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Djti Vu: Extraterritoriality,International
Environmental Law, and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-U.S. Transboundary Water
Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363, 415 (2005); see also Colleen P. Graffy, Water,
Water, Everywhere, Nor Any Drop to Drink: The Urgency of TransnationalSolutions to
InternationalRiparian Disputes, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 399, 424 (1998) (explaining
how the Boundary Waters Treaty was one of the first "non-navigational international watercourse treaties").
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tion was "a long and hard fought process,"45 the result was visionary for its
time: "[t]he substantive law of the treaty, the political-legal concepts underlying conflict-avoidance and dispute-settlement, and its pioneering antipollution obligations all fashioned a multiple-use instrument that went beyond experience elsewhere and perhaps even beyond the full appreciation of
the draftsmen themselves."46 The treaty established "principles for the use
of boundary waters, including the Great Lakes,"47 but its potential reach
extended to "all boundary questions, and arguably to other questions of
common concern as well. 48
The Treaty's purpose was straightforward. It sought "to ensure the
equitable sharing of boundary waters between Canada and the United
States, 49 while encouraging and providing mechanisms for dispute resolution.50 In relation to diverting waters (including those from the Great
Lakes), the Treaty provided that Canada and the U.S. could not divert
boundary waters "affecting the natural level or flow of boundary waters on
the other side of the [border]" without permission from the IJC.51 The treaty
also set forth other important obligations, including: (1) the obligation not to
pollute boundary waters,52 and (2) reciprocal court access in cases involving
water diversion or obstruction.53 Each nation pledged that "boundary waters
... flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the
54
injury of health or property on the other.
The International Joint Commission (IJC) was the entity created to
administer the Treaty and protect the interests of both countries. The IJC

45. DeWitt, supra note 41, at 306. For a detailed historical description of the
Treaty's negotiation, see Dreisziger, supranote 42, at 8-21.
46. Maxwell Cohen, The Commissionfrom the Inside, in THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT
COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON 108 (Robert Spencer et al. eds., 1981).
47. Valiante, Harmonizationof Great Lakes, supra note 5, at 527; Dellapenna, supra note 38, at 856 (explaining that ."[b]oundary waters' are narrowly defined to include
only waterbodies (or their connecting waters) that straddle or cross the international boundary") (quoting 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, preliminary article).
48. Richard B. Bilder, Controlling GreatLakes Pollution: A Study in United StatesCanadian Environmental Cooperation,70 MICH. L. REV. 469, 481 (1972).
49. F.J.E. Jordan, Great Lakes Pollution: A Frameworkfor Action, 5 OTTAWA L.
REV. 65, 66 (1971).
50.
1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, pmbl., at 2448 (stating the purpose
of the Treaty in the Preamble is "to prevent disputes regarding the use of boundary waters
and to settle all questions which are now pending.., involving the rights, obligations, or
interests [of Canada and the United States]").
51. Id. art. III, at 2449-50.
52. Id art. IV, at 2450.
53. Id. art. III, at 2449 (permitting injured parties to pursue the same legal remedies
available if injured on the other side of the border).
54. Id. art. IV, at 2450.
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was the "first permanent US-Canadian institution."5 It was created as an
independent, "bi-national body, comprised of six commissioners, three appointed by the United States and three by Canada. 5' 6 Although the Boundary Waters Treaty assigned the IJC "surprisingly wide powers,"" the commissioners were intended to be nonpolitical and impartial. 8 The IJC's administrative, quasi-judicial, arbitral, and even investigative powers59 were
part of an "ambitious institutional design."' The treaty granted the IJC the
power to approve all works and diversions that could impact the natural
flow of the boundary waters, including most Great Lakes' diversions.6
Despite having no enforcement powers, "[n]o other transboundary institution in the world compare[d] with the IJC" with respect to its powers.6"
For dispute resolution purposes, the Boundary Waters Treaty "estab'
lishe[d] broad and flexible provisions."63
Article IX of the Treaty authorized the IJC to render advisory reports at the governments' request, and
provided for a reference procedure:
55. Kal J. Holsti & Thomas Allen Levy, BilateralInstitutions and Transgovernmental Relations Between Canadaand the United States, in CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES:
TRANSNATIONAL AND TRANSGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 281, 285 (Annette Baker Fox et al.
eds., 1976).
56. Sheryl A. Rosenberg, A Canadian Perspective on the Devils Lake Outlet: Towards an EnvironmentalAssessment Modelfor the Management of TransboundaryDisputes,
76 N.D. L. REV. 817, 841 (2000) (detailing the IJC's structure). For a good recent discussion
of the Commission and its powers, see Herb Gray, Canadaand U.S. Approaches to Health
Care: How the Canadian and US. Political,Regulatory, and Legal Systems Impact Health
Care, 31 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 287, 290-94 (2005).
57. William R. Willoughby, Expectations and Experience, in THE INTERNATIONAL
JOINT COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON 24 (Robert Spencer et al. eds., 1981); see also Toope
& Brunnrde, supra note 16, at 275 (noting the "unusually strong powers with which the IJC
was endowed"); Holsti & Levy, supra note 55, at 286 (describing how the IJC had "policymaking and regulatory powers far exceeding that of many committees and boards established
after 1945" by the two countries).
58. L.H. Legault, The Roles of Law and Diplomacy in Dispute Resolution: The IJC
as a Possible Model, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 47, 49-50 (2000). The IJC's impartiality is buttressed by providing immunity to both the IJC and the commissioners from judicial process
in both countries. Paisley et al., supra note 42, at 183. In addition, "the Commission's decisions are not subject to appeal to the courts of either country." Id
59. See generally Willoughby, supra note 57, at 25-38 (describing the Commission's powers); Bilder, supra note 48, at 485-89 (describing the Commission's powers).
60. Toope & Brunnre, supra note 16, at 275.
61.
1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, art. III; see also Bilder, supra note
48, at 482.
62. Toope & Brunnre, supra note 16, at 275; see also Graffy, supra note 44, at 424
(describing the IJC as "particularly effective" and that the Boundary Waters Treaty is
"[o]ften emulated as a model for the international community"); cf Don Munton, Paradoxes
and Prospects, in THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON 60 (Robert
Spencer et al. eds., 1981) (noting that the IJC has been "recognized internationally as one of
the most ambitious examples of a joint boundary water authority").
63. Bilder, supra note 48, at 483.
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[A]ny other questions or matters of difference arising between [Canada and the
U.S.] involving the rights, obligations, or interests of either in relation to the other
.. shall be referred
or to the inhabitants of the other, along the common frontier
64
from time to time to the [IJC] for examination and report.

Article X, in turn, provided detailed procedures upon which the two governments could agree to binding arbitration to resolve differences.65
The IJC, for much of its existence, has been influential. It was created
at a time of great optimism for international institutions, and both countries
embraced it in the early twentieth century with a sense of pride. 66 The IJC
handled references "ranging from typhoid in the waters of the Great Lakes
in 1929 to air pollution in the Detroit-Windsor area in 1978 and pollution of
Lake Erie from oil and gas drilling in 1969. "67 In its first seventy years, the
IJC handled well over one hundred cases, 68 including most notably: the Garrison Dam project; 69 the Trail Smelter controversy from the 1920s;7o and
diversions, damming, and other projects related to the Columbia, Flathead,
Mary, Milk, Skagit, and St. Croix rivers.71
The IJC also played a significant role in managing and protecting the
Great Lakes.7 ' This included: (1) a 1912 reference to the IJC "to determine
'[t]o what extent ... have the boundary waters between the United States

64. 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, art. IX.
65. Id. art. X (giving the IJC the power, upon reference by joint consent, to "render a
decision or finding [upon] any questions or matters so referred" which "involve[d] the rights,
obligations, or interests" of the U.S. or Canada).
66. Cohen, supra note 46, at 109-10.
67. Timothy M. Gulden, Transfrontier Pollution and the InternationalJoint Commission: A Superior Means of Dispute Resolution, 17 Sw. U. L. REV. 43, 60 (1987) (citing to
ALLEN L. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 162 (1983)).
68. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, THE IJC AND THE 2 1ST CENTURY 10 (1997);
see also Paisley et al., supra note 42, at 187 (explaining that the IJC "is thought to stand out
as an institution that has effectively and peacefully managed the boundary waters of two
nations over ninety years, reconciling or averting more than 130 disputes in the process")
[hereinafter COMMISSION]; Wang, supra note 7, at 165 (explaining that "[i]n over one hundred cases referred to [the IJC] from 1912 to [1981] it has produced unanimous reports in all
but four cases").
69. Legault, supra note 58, at 53.
70. COMMISSION, supra note 68, at 10; see also Parrish, supra note 44. The most
extensive analysis of the Trail Smelter arbitration by leading scholars is TRANSBOUNDARY
HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION (Rebecca M.
Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006).
71. See generally Legault, supra note 58, at 53-54 (describing IJC's involvement
with diversion, damming, and other projects).
72. For a detailed discussion of the IJC's involvement with the Great Lakes, see
James G. Chandler & Michael J. Vechsler, The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin from
an IJC Perspective, 18 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261, 268-78 (1992).
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and Canada been polluted so as to be injurious to the public health'; 3 (2) a
1946 reference "to investigate pollution in the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair
and the Detroit River" flowing into the Great Lakes;74 and (3) a 1964 reference, where the IJC was asked "to conduct an in-depth analysis of water
quality in Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the International Section of the St.
Lawrence River."75 The IJC, throughout the seventies, eighties, and nineties, "played a critically important role in studying potential threats to the
waters of the Great Lakes."76
Until the late 1970s, the governments demonstrated their faith in the
IJC. In the 1950s, for example, the IJC recommended that the countries
authorize it "to establish and maintain continuing supervision over boundary
waters pollution through boards of control appointed by" the IJC. 77 "The
governments approved.., the [IJC's] recommendations, including expansion of its power, and incorporated the objectives into their pollution abatement programs. '78 As a result, the period from 1945 through 1965 was an
IJC golden era, characterized by large scale water development and joint
cooperation.79
The IJC's hard work paid off. The IJC was "highly respected"8 and
seen as successful in fulfilling its mandate. 1 It was "praised as a low-key,
73. Woodward, supra note 41, at 329 (citing I.J.C. Files, Docket No. 4 (1912) and
quoting INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT
COMMISSION ON THE POLLUTION OF BOUNDARY WATERS REFERENCE 5 (1918)).

74. Id. at 330.
75. Id. at 331 (citing I.J.C. Files, Docket No. 83 (1964)).
76. Hall, Horizontal Federalism, supra note 5, at 418; see also Cohen, supra note
46, at 106-08 ("Whatever differences may exist among scholars, there is no important division on the central idea that the IJC has played an unusually constructive part in disputeavoidance and settlement as well as in such quasi-managerial functions as those it performs
[in relation to the Great Lakes] .... "); cf INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, PROTECTION
OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES: FINAL REPORT TO THE GOvERNMENTS OF CANADA AND
THE UNITED STATES (2000).

77.

INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL

JOINT

COMMISSION, UNITED STATES AND CANADA, ON THE POLLUTION OF BOUNDARY WATERS

(1950).
78. Woodward, supranote 41, at 331.
79. Barry Sadler, The Management of Canada-U.S. Boundary Waters: Retrospect
and Prospect,26 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 359, 363-64 (1986).
80. Gregory Wetstone & Armin Rosencranz, Transboundary Air Pollution: The
Searchfor an InternationalResponse, 8 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 89, 134 (1984).
81. See John E. Carroll, Patterns Old & New, in THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT
COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON 43 (Robert Spencer et al. eds., 1981) (noting the IJC's
"history of generally successful operation and its legacy of great accomplishments" up to the
end of the 1970s); Cohen, supra note 46, at 106-07 (describing the Commission as "the oldest and most durable of the constellation of Canada-United States joint institutions" and
asserting that "an unreserved unanimity exists about the usefulness of the Commission since
its beginnings"); Leonard B. Dworsky & Albert E. Utton, Assessing North America's Management of Transboundary Waters, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 413, 415-16 (1993) (explaining
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behind the scenes actor that help[ed] move governments to solutions the
governments [were] prepared to accept,"82 and was commended for its "objectivity and leadership on environmental issues." 3 For dispute resolution,
legal scholars described it as "one of a kind."84 In part, its legitimacy and
respect was a result of its independence and impartiality: the "commissioners [sought] consensus in making decisions and rarely split along national
lines."85
B. The IJC's Marginalization
But things changed. In the late 1970s, the IJC attempted to take a
more active role in transboundary resource management and increase its
that "[i]n most evaluations, the Commission comes out with high grades" and is a "model[]
of success in many ways"); Legault, supranote 58, at 54 (asserting that it is "hard to quarrel
with [the IJC's] long record of success" and stating that the "Commission [is] truly one of a
kind as a system for the settlement of disputes"); Kim Richard Nossal, The IJC in Retrospect,
in THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON 124, 126 (Robert Spencer et
al. eds., 1981) (noting the IJC's longevity in its first sixty years as an "active and effective
international institution" and that "[tihe Commission, all agree, has been a remarkably successful institution"); see generally Parrish, supra note 44, at 417-18 nn.285-91 (compiling a
list of articles that view the IJC as successful and influential in carrying out its duties under
the Boundary Waters Treaty).

82.

Alan M. Schwartz, Great Lakes: Great Rhetoric, in

TENSIONS AT THE BORDER:

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 70 (Jonathan

Lemco ed., 1992); see also Holsti & Levy, supra note 55, at 287-88 (explaining that because
the IJC's "studies are based on extensive research by technical specialists, its recommendations are influential and are usually acted upon by the senior governments" and that "the IJC
can defuse potentially contentious issues; hence its conflict-avoidance function").
83. Hall, HorizontalFederalism,supra note 5, at 418 (citing Sadler, supra note 79,
at 370-72). Of course, the IJC has made its mistakes, even in the early years. Willoughby,
supra note 57, at 32-33 (describing errors committed by the Commission as "debit items").
84. Legault, supra note 58, at 54.
85. David Lemarquand, The InternationalJoint Commission and Changing CanadaUnited States Boundary Relations, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 68 (1993); see also P.W.
BIRNIE & A.E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 326 (2d ed. 2002) (praising the IJC's "independence [from] both governments" as an "important and unusual characteristic[]"); Carroll, supra note 81, at 46, 58 (noting that the "requirements of the treaty and
the low profile of the Commission reduce IJC vulnerability to current political whims and
pressures" and that it has a "reputation for impartiality"); Alice M. Nobel-Allgire, Transfrontier EnvironmentalDamage, 84 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoC. 12, 18 (1990) (giving remarks by
Blair Seabom, former Canadian chairman of the IJC and former Canadian Deputy Minister
of the Environment, describing the IJC as "a unique institution that acts with a remarkable
degree of independence and objectivity in the judgments and the recommendations it
makes"); Nossal, supra note 81, at 124 (explaining how the IJC and its "reserve armies of
technical experts" are "untainted by purely partisan national*concerns" leading to "impartial
conclusions"); cf Cohen, supra note 46, at 107 ("To some extent the central point of occasional tension, albeit a creative tension, between the governments and the IJC has been the
evolution of a Commission view or rationale for its operations which was at times distinct
from the views of either or both governments.").
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responsibilities.86 In two high profile cases involving the St. Mary's River
and the Garrison Diversion Project, the IJC asserted a right to be consulted
only to be rebuffed by the respective governments.87 The attempt to create a
Commission regional office in Windsor, Ontario in 1977 also ruffled government feathers and was seen as an IJC power-grab. 88 Although the office
was ultimately created, it was removed from direct IJC authority: one commissioner describing the result as "a disguised but effective emasculation of
the IJC."8 9 And the IJC increasingly came under attack for resolving matters slowly. 9° As one commentator described: "[t]hese activist initiatives
along with governments' frustration at the length of time the IJC took to
complete its investigations shook the governments' confidence in the IJC."'
Ultimately, the IJC was seen as a threat to sovereignty. 92 Canada, particularly, became disenchanted with the IJC, believing that Canadian interests
were not sufficiently protected.93 By early 1981, for almost a year, the IJC
was entirely unable to function.'
86. Lemarquand, supra note 85, at 75; cf Schwartz, supra note 82, at 70-71 (describing how, in a 1982 biennial report, the Commission sharply critiqued the government,
but what was viewed as a "potentially new 'more aggressive' role for the commission" soon
ended).
87. Lemarquand, supranote 85, at 75; see also Munton, supranote 62, at 80-81.
88. Lemarquand, supranote 85, at 76; Munton, supra note 62, at 80.
89. Munton, supra note 62, at 80 (quoting former Commissioner Keith Henry at the
July 1978 IJC public meeting on the Great Lakes Water Quality in Windsor, Ontario).
90. Carroll, supra note 81, at 51 (describing the "most prevalent criticism of the
IJC" to be its "sheer slowness of operation"); Willoughby, supra note 57, at 38 (conceding
that "occasionally the Commission's boards have taken an unreasonably long time to conduct
their studies and to submit their findings").
91. Lemarquand, supra note 85, at 76.
92. Munton, supra note 62, at 80 (citing Memorandum, George R. Alexander, Director Region V (Great Lakes Area), EPA to Barbara Blum, EPA, Washington, May 16,
1977) (recommending that the regional office be "disestablished" as it could "lead to the
'erosion of the sovereign authority' of the governments"); see also Nossal, supra note 81, at
129 ("To surrender-even willingly-a modicum of national sovereignty [to IJC-type institutions] would be disadvantageous to both sides, but to Canadians in particular.").
93. Nossal, supra note 81, at 129; see also Holsti & Levy, supra note 55, at 287 n.2
(noting comments of a Canadian official "who suggested that more bodies of the IJC type
would not be welcome [in 1976] because they are difficult to control by the central governments"); Lemarquand, supra note 85, at 76 ("Although Canada, as the smaller power, had
traditionally found the IJC a useful balancing mechanism, the Canadian government confidence in the IJC was on increasingly shaky ground as Canada lost confidence in bilateral
institutional mechanisms as the best means of dealing with the United States."); Sax &
Keiter, supra note 12, at 295-98 (describing the unlikelihood that Canada would agree to an
IJC referral).
94. Catherine A. Cooper, The Management of InternationalEnvironmentalDisputes
in the Context of Canada-UnitedStates Relations: A Survey and Evaluation of Techniques
and Mechanisms, 24 CAN. Y.B. INT'L. L. 247, 255 n.32 (1986) (noting that, from January to
September 1981, five of the six commission positions were left vacant and the commission
was unable to operate).
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Beginning in the 1980s, the countries forced the IJC to embrace a different role. "[R]ecourse to the historic International Joint Commission declined significantly," 95 and the countries "drastically reduced their reliance
upon the IJC's reference functions."96 Between 1977 and 1991, only two
matters were referred to the IJC for investigation.9" And, of course, neither
Canada nor the United States referred a matter for a binding decision.9 8
Even in the Great Lakes context, the IJC's powers were undermined. Although in 1986 the IJC was given authority to veto diversions from the
Great Lakes, 99 the IJC had little influence100 Indeed, the more the IJC tried
to reinvent itself to play some role in solving transboundary environmental
problems, the more "its freedom of action [was] curtailed by increasingly
reluctant governments."'' Indicative of its dwindling influence, numerous
proposals were written to revamp or restructure the IJC entirely.'0 2 By the
early 1990s, the governments had "little interest in seeing the IJC regain the
profile it used to have in bilateral relations or take on any of the new environmental challenges facing the two countries."'0 3
In the last few years, the IJC has been bypassed completely, even in
cases where the Boundary Waters Treaty would certainly apply and the IJC
would be a logical place to turn. Two of the most contentious and well95. Lemarquand, supra note 85, at 77 (quoting A. Gotlieb, The United States In
CanadianForeign Policy, Presented at the O.D. Skeleton Memorial Lecture 12 (Dec. 10,
1991)); see also Carroll, supranote 81, at 43 (arguing that "the Commission is operating at a
level well below potential"); Willoughby, supra note 57, at 38 ("It is true that at times both
governments have seemed reluctant to ask the IJC to tackle difficult issues.").
96. Toope & Brunnre, supra note 16, at 282; see also Marcel Cadieux, The View
from the PearsonBuilding, in THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON 99
(Robert Spencer et al. eds., 1981) (noting that "the two governments seem to have always
taken a cautious approach to questions involving the strength of the Commission," and describing two situations in the 1970s when the government refused to strengthen the Commission's role).
97. Toope & Brunnde, supra note 16, at 282 (citing David Lemarquand, supra note
85, at 74-75 (1993)).
98. Chandler & Vechsler, supra note 72, at 263 (explaining that the IJC has "never
been asked to undertake [its binding arbitration] role"). When arbitration between the two
countries occurred, the countries used a special convention. Legault, supra note 58, at 51
(describing the process by which an arbitral decision can be handed down by the IJC through
special convention); see also Wang, supra note 7, at 224-28 (summarizing Canada-U.S.
arbitral decisions).
99. Water Resources Development Act of 1986,42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20 (2000).
100. Dellapenna, supra note 38, at 858, 861-62 (noting how the IJC has had little
influence over Great Lakes diversions "because the governors of Michigan have vetoed
nearly all such diversions").
101. Toope & Brunnde, supranote 16, at 275.
102. See, e.g., Munton, supra note 62, at 64-81; see also Carroll, supranote 81, at 43
(arguing for IJC reform and increased IJC power). But see Toope & Brunne, supra note 16,
at 282 (criticizing proposals to increase IJC powers).
103. Lemarquand, supra note 85, at 77.
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known controversies are the Trail Smelter and the Devil's Lake Project.
The Trail Smelter controversy is an ongoing case, Pakootas v. Teck
Cominco, where the U.S. EPA and a private citizens group filed suit in a
U.S. court against a Canadian company operating solely in Canada, under
the U.S. Superfund law, for transboundary pollution."° The Devil's Lake
Project controversy involves the State of North Dakota's plan to build a
diversion channel to drain a polluted lake into a river that runs into Canada. °5 In both disputes, the IJC was rendered powerless, or at least kept out
of the picture. Both countries, with more nationalist moods, have grown to
see the IJC as marginally relevant.
III. A LAMENT: THE FORGOTTEN EFFECTIVENESS OF BILATERAL
INSTITUTIONS

The IJC's marginalization and the creation of a sub-national regime
that replaces an existing international regime raises several obvious questions. What motivates the countries' reluctance to use the IJC or to
strengthen the Boundary Waters Treaty through treaty amendment? What is
behind the rise of a state and provincial sub-national management regime?
Despite the reasons behind the change, are these developments positive? A
detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this short Article, but a few observations can be made.
Although the political reasons behind the creation of the Compact and
Agreement are complex, at least two trends created a receptive political
environment for its development. First, the Compact and Agreement reflect
the changing nature of international relations where states, provinces, and
other non-governmental actors play an increasingly important role.0 6 Na104. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-AAM, 2004 WL
2578982, at *17 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004) (order denying motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds), aff'd, 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006); see generally Parrish, supra note 44.
Several academics have now commented on the case. See, e.g., Neil Craik, Trail Smelter
Redux: TransboundaryPollution and ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC.
139 (2004); Jutta Brunn6e, The UnitedStates and InternationalEnvironmentalLaw: Living
with an Elephant, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 617 (2004); Gerald F. Hess, The Trail Smelter, the
Columbia River, and the ExtraterritorialApplication of CERCLA, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 1 (2005); Michael J. Robinson-Dorn, The Trail Smelter: Is What's Past Prologue?EPA
Blazes a New Trailfor CERCLA, 14 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 233 (2006).
105. Province of Manitoba v. Norton, 398 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2005); see also
John Knox, Environment: GarrisonDam, the Columbia River, the IJC, NGOs, 30 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 129 (2004); Rosenberg, supra note 56; United States and CanadaAgree on Measures to
Address Devils Lake Flooding and Ecological Protection, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 909 (John R.
Crook ed., 2005).
106. Although the prominence of non-state actors is new, their involvement in transnational relations is not. See, e.g., Holsti & Levy, supra note 55, at 283 (explaining how
"[t]he informal and formal communications between federal government bureaucracies and
between officials of the states and provinces are no less important" than formal government
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tional governments and nation-states "are no longer the sole bearers of
rights and duties in the international sphere, nor are they the sole actors in
the international arena."' 7 Non-state and sub-national actors, like states and
provinces, have an important voice in international relations and law. 8
"Domestic interest groups, transnational corporations, and global networks
of NGOs all take part in the new global, political, and social constellation
that defines the age of globalization."'0 9 Local governments are "increasingly becoming major actors in the emerging global legal order.''.° Even

institutions); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., TransnationalRelations and Interstate Conflicts: An Empirical Analysis, in CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: TRANSNATIONAL AND
TRANSGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 367, 367-69 (Annette Fox et al. eds., 1976) (describing
the importance of transnational and transgovernmental actors as well as state actors in Canada-U.S. relations); see generally TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICs (Robert
0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 1972).
107. Yishai Blank, Localism in the New Global Legal Order, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J.
263, 265 (2006); see also Yishai Blank, The City and the World, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 875, 883-84 (2006) (cataloguing literature describing roles of non-state actors in international law). For some general discussions of the phenomenon, see Duncan B. Hollis, Why
State Consent Still Matters-Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 137 (2005); Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the
Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REv. 167, 169-75 (1999). For a discussion of subnational
regimes in the context of climate change litigation, see Hari M. Osofsky, Local Approaches
to TransnationalCorporateResponsibility Mapping the Role of SubnationalClimate Change
Litigation(2007) (on file with author).
108. See generally Peter J. Spiro, Nonstate Actors in Global Politics, 92 AM. J. INT'L
L. 808 (1998) (reviewing literature describing the recent rise of non-state actors in international law); see also Philippe Sands, Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 527, 529 (2001) (describing a system in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries where "the state was the only player, and the need to protect
its sovereignty was paramount," and recent changes to this model); Nossal, supra note 81, at
126 (describing how even in the early 1980s decentralizing trends were apparent).
109. Blank, supranote 107, at 265; see also Paul Schiff Berman, From International
Law to Law and Globalization,43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485, 492-511 (2005) (describing the myriad of non-state actors that influence international law); Robert 0. Keohane &
Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,27 WORLD
POL. 39, 41 (1974) (describing the development of networks that drive international policy);
Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF. Sept./Oct. 184-86 (1997)
(arguing that the state is disaggregating in part because of transgovernmental networks);
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (exploring governmental networks
created by disaggregated states) [hereinaftet SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER].
110. Blank, supra note 107, at 263; see also Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, International Local Government Law, 38 URB. LAW. 1 (2006) (describing the development of
international local government law); Julie Mertus, ConsideringNonstate Actors in the New
Millennium: Toward ExpandedParticipationin Norm Generationand Norm Application, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 537, 552-56 (2000) (describing the prominence of non-state actors
in a globalized world).

1316

Michigan State Law Review

[Vol. 2006:1299

non-state judicial systems appear on the rise."' Many scholars observing
the change pay more attention to actors within states" 2 or emphasize the
role of transnational processes" 3 and global, transgovernmental networks." 4
Given this now well-catalogued phenomenon, the fact that states and
provinces have reached out to tackle transboundary problems on their own
is hardly astonishing, particularly since they appear to act with the federal
government's blessing. Surely, the scholarship that embraces sub-national
actors as international norm creators often contains both a descriptive and a
normative component. In a globalized world, sub-national actors not only
can, but are expected, to act and solve global problems. In that context, the
pressure on the national governments to reach agreements over environmental issues-such as Great Lakes diversions-declines.
Another trend also helps explain why sub-national agreements, like
the Compact and Agreement, are coming into existence-despite the existence of the Boundary Waters Treaty. The U.S. reluctance to use the IJC is
not an isolated occurrence; rather it reflects a larger trend. In recent years,
the U.S. rejected or retreated from international treaties in a whole host of
contexts. "' Some academics actively encouraged this disengagement, be111. See Brynna Connolly, Non-State Justice Systems and the State: Proposalsfor a
Recognition Typology, 38 CONN. L. REv. 239 (2005) (examining non-state justice systems for
indigenous groups).
112. See OONA A. HATHAWAY & HAROLD HONGJu KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (2005); Eric A. Posner, InternationalLaw and the Disaggregated State, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 797, 799-801 (2005) (describing the difference
between a traditional unitary state model and a theory that disaggregates the state); Paul
Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of InternationalLaw, 84 TEX. L. REv. 1265, 130206 (2006) (reviewing JACK A. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005)) (describing cosmopolitanism and critiquing realist, state-centric visions of
international law).
113. See Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181
(1996); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2645-58 (1997).
114. SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 109, at 108-27; see Kal Raustiala,
The Architecture of InternationalCooperation:TransgovernmentalNetworks and the Future
ofInternationalLaw, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
115. See generally Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J.
1193, 1197 (2005) (describing U.S. opposition to a "dazzlingly broad" range of international
laws and institutions, including the ICC, the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations agencies, the
Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty); see also Jeffrey
L. Dunoff, ConstitutionalConceits: The WTO's 'Constitution' and the Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 647, 670 (2006) ("[The U.S.,J in particular, has recently had a
decidedly uneasy relationship with international legal norms and institutions, as illustrated by
the refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the 'unsigning' of the Rome Treaty creating the
International Criminal Court, the rejection of the Land Mines and Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaties, the repudiation of the ABM treaty, and, perhaps most ominously, the assertion of a
doctrine of preventive war that is in considerable tension with conventional understandings
of the norms governing the use of force.").
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lieving international law to threaten democratic sovereignty." 6 This scholarship, to the extent it indiscriminately indicts all international institutions,
is misguided but has influenced policy makers. In such a world, embracing
the IJC may be politically impossible for the two countries.
As a normative matter, the IJC's decreased relevance 1 7 is unfortunate.
First, the IJC has served the countries well in the past, particularly when it
comes to factual findings and public participation. Most scholars believe
that it has been highly successful. The IJC "is an institution strikingly open
to public participation.""' Indeed, the IJC-with half of its members being
American and half Canadian-has some of the qualities of a hybrid court,
seen as positive in other contexts." 9 As two commentators have described
the IJC's value:
First and foremost, [the IJC is valuable because of its] binational advice formulated
by eminent statesmen appointed at the most senior levels of the Canadian and
United States Governments. Secondly, the advice is developed relying on the best
scientific and socio-economic expertise available from the government and private
sectors as well as from affected or concerned interest groups. Thirdly, it is formu2
lated in a less adversarial atmosphere than would exist in binational discussions. 0
116. See generally Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International Law, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1404 (2006) (reviewing JACK L.
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)) (describing the

revisionist movement to undermine the use of international law because of its perceived
inconsistency with democratic governance); see, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER,
THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (presenting a critical, negative view of international law and a disdain for international institutions); ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE:
THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 10 (2003) (asserting that international courts undermine

democratic institutions to advance a liberal agenda). For additional examples, in a similar
vein, see Paul B. Stephan, Sheriff or Prisoner? The United States and the World Trade Organization, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 49, 73 (2000); Paul B. Stephan, InternationalGovernance and
American Democracy, 1 CHI. J.INT'L L. 237 (2000); John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global
Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 205 (2000); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The CurrentIllegitimacy of InternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM
L. REv. 319 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw
as FederalCommon Law: A Critiqueof the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. REv. 815 (1997).
117. It is unclear whether the Boundary Waters Treaty has been undermined or
strengthened. The Compact may paradoxically strengthen the Boundary Waters Treaty by
making the Treaty enforceable through the citizen suit provisions. For a discussion, see Hall,
HorizontalFederalism,supranote 5.
118. Toope & Brunnee, supra note 16, at 283.
119. William W. Burke-White, InternationalLegal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L.
963, 976-77 (2004) (indicating that hybrid tribunals are models by which national and international legal systems are influencing each other, whereby the international system may
include local judges, prosecutors, and procedures to make it a more unified system); see also
Brady Hall, Using Hybrid Tribunals as Trivias: Furtheringthe Goals of Post-ConflictJustice While Transferring Casesfrom the ICTY to Serbia's Domestic War Crimes Tribunal, 13
MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 39, 45-46 (2005) (demonstrating that "hybrid" courts are a combination
of international and local law where judges are both international and local).
120. Chandler & Vechsler, supra note 72, at 281-82.
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Seen in this light, the whittling away of the IJC's power-first by relegating
it to the Great Lakes and then second supplanting
it entirely-if not mis121
guided, is certainly not a positive development.
Second, the issue of Great Lakes' diversions is not purely a regional22
problem. The Great Lakes are a national, if not an international, resource.
In fact, one of the motivations behind the Compact and Agreement was to
prevent arid southwestern states from accessing Great Lakes water. 23 And
many of the challenges facing the Great Lakes, such as climate change, are
not purely regional issues. 24 Some suggest that the Great Lakes water
121. Ironically, the IJC had a hand itself in these developments. It was a 2000 IJC
report recommending greater regional involvement that spurred the state and provincial
governments to act. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE
GREAT LAKES: FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

(2000).
122. The Great Lakes Charter Annex: A Supplementary Agreement to the Great
Lakes Charter, June 18, 2001, http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/GreatLakesCharter
Annex.pdf (describing the Great Lakes as a "national treasure"); see also The Great Lakes
Water Quality Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1268(a)(1)(A) (2002) (stating that "the Great Lakes are a
valuable national resource, continuously serving the people of the United States and other
nations as an important source of food, fresh water, recreation, beauty, and enjoyment").
123. Klein, supra note 39, at 18-20 (describing the Great Lakes "water wars" and
describing the change of political power from the Midwestern states to the Southwest); see
also Rob Fanjoy, Governors Sign GreatLakes Compact, PLANNING, Feb. 2006, at 50 (noting
that the Compact intended to prevent diversions to the arid west and that supporters of the
Compact hope it will be signed into law prior to 2010, "when western and southwestern
states with rapidly growing populations will undoubtedly gain more congressional seats");
Anonymous, They Need It. We Waste It., CHI. READER, Jan. 13, 2006, at 1 (describing the
Compact as a "mid-continent OPEC" to protect the Great Lakes Basin from diversions to the
aiid southwest); Gretchen Ehlke, GreatLakes Governors OK Water Deal-Fearsthat Southwest States Will Try Tapping into the Lakes Are Behind the Agreement, WIS. ST. J., Dec. 14,
2005, at C l (stating that Governors signed the Compact to prevent booming Southwest cities
from raiding Great Lakes water); see also That Big Sucking Sound, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS,
Oct. 22, 2001, at D4 (describing a billboard entitled "Back off suckers. Water diversion...
the last straw"). The Canadians had similar concerns. See, e.g., Troubled Waters on Great
Lakes, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 25, 2004, at H06 (noting that "Canadian environmentalists have
argued that [prior drafts of the Compact and Agreement] amount[ed] to little more than a box
of straws for sucking more and more water out of the Great Lakes"); cf Christopher Scott
Maravilla, The Canadian Bulk. Water Moratorium and Its Implications for NAFTA, 10
CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L.J. 29 (2001) (describing Canada's prohibition on all bulk water
exports of Canadian freshwater).
124. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT
LAKES, INTERIM REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 12, 20
(1999), http://ijc.org/php/publicationsihtml/interimreport/interimreporte.html (noting concerns over the impact of global warming on the Great Lakes); see also Tarlock, supra note 9,
at 39 (explaining that "[g]lobal climate change helps fuel the persistent regional fear that the
lakes will be tapped to augment water supplies outside the basin, although the lakes are less
vulnerable to the projected effects of global climate change than small bodies of water in arid
regions") (citing Stanley Changnon, Understandingthe Physical Setting: The Great Lakes
Climate and Lake Level Functions, in LAKE MICHIGAN DIVERSION AT CHICAGO AND URBAN
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should be exported internationally on humanitarian grounds, "as pollution,
'
overuse and population pressures have imperiled [world] water supplies." 25
Moreover, regional compacts and agreements raise significant constitutional
concerns126 and serious questions as to whether diversion bans violate international trade agreements, like GATT and NAFTA, which international
agreements do not. 7 Therefore, solving
Great Lakes issues through re2
gional agreements seems less than ideal. 1
Lastly, whether private litigation in the district courts is the best, or
only, way to resolve complicated transboundary problems is unclear.2 9 One
of the significant changes of the Compact and Agreement's regime from the
Boundary Water Treaty is the ability for private enforcement actions. 30 The
Boundary Waters Treaty does not permit private enforcement action.' But

DRAUGHT: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE REGIONAL IMPACTS AND RESPONSES TO GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE 39 (Stanley Changnon ed., 1994)); Charles F. Glass, Jr., Note, Enforcing

Great Lakes Water Export Restrictions Under the Water Resources Development Act of
1986, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1503, 1504 (2003) (noting that "several studies have forecasted
that climate change could substantially reduce lake levels in coming years").
125. Brian D. Anderson, Selling Great Lakes Water to a Thirsty World: Legal, Policy
& Trade Considerations,6 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 217, 223 (1999).
126. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
127. Milos Barutciski, Trade Regulation of Fresh Water Exports: The Phantom Menace Revisited, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 145 (2002); Sanford E. Gaines, Fresh Water: Environment
or Trade?, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 157 (2002).
128. Hall, Horizontal Federalism, supra note 5, at 449 ("Clearly individual states,
acting alone, cannot adequately address transboundary and interstate pollution."); see also
Mark A. Drumbl, Environmental Supra-Nationalism, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 289, 298
(2002) ("Environmental policy cannot just be a matter for local government. Accordingly,
environmental governance increasingly is operating at the regional, continental, multinational, and even global level."); Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for TransboundaryPollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 931-34 (1997) (explaining that legal regimes have been slow to develop to address the issue of transboundary pollution).
129. Hall, Horizontal Federalism, supra note 5, at 449 (noting that the U.S. Supreme
Court "has admitted that it is not the ideal forum for addressing transboundary pollution
disputes, which tend to involve complex technical and scientific issues with major political
and economic ramifications"); cf John Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons of ForeignPolicy:
The Case of the Helms-Burton Act, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 747, 764-66, 772
(1997) (arguing that courts are "imperfect tools for gathering information, especially when
relevant issues for decision involve broader political, economic, and social events and
trends"); see also Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83
AM. J. INT'L L. 821, 830 (1989) (noting the problems with domestic courts deciding issues
involving foreign affairs); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REv.. 1617, 1668 (1997) (arguing that courts are poorly equipped to address
questions involving foreign relations).
130. See supra notes 26-35, and accompanying text (describing private enforcement
actions under the Compact).
131.
Dellapenna, supra note 38, at 857 ("Private litigants who have attempted to
invoke the terms of the Boundary Waters Treaty to challenge regulatory decisions in the
United States have been uniformly rebuffed."); see also DiLaura v. Power Auth. of N.Y., 786
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transboundary issues-such as diversion of water from the Great Lakesoften implicate complicated scientific and environmental issues that courts
may not be ideally suited to address. Also, potential problems with the appearance of court-bias may undermine the perceived legitimacy of any court
decision.'32 This is not to jump into the burgeoning debate over whether
domestic courts should, or effectively can, enforce international law. Instead, the point is that some international institutions, like the IJC, can complement or avoid domestic litigation by building consensus.
This is not to suggest that Canada and the United States need some
form of continental government. The IJC was never intended for such a
purpose,'33 and this Article does not argue otherwise. The IJC has always
been a pragmatic, consensus-building institution, used as a means to equitably solve cross-border dilemmas while minimally interfering with national
sovereignty. Not at its creation, and not now, is anyone suggesting "the
utopian dreams of new levels of government and the 'surrender of sovereignty' to higher forms of international life which bedazzled political philosophers in the post-war years."'34 Nor is it to argue that the Commission
should be imparted with significant, or perhaps even any, enforcement powers. Many institutional reasons suggest that advocating such an approach
would be impractical.'35 The point made here is more modest: some problems-such as Great Lakes diversions-are international problems, which
will continue to benefit from international solutions. In short, as a new subnational regulatory regime edges one-step closer to fruition, in the form of
the Compact and Agreement, the countries should not forget the IJC. If we
are wise, it is an institution that will remain pertinent.
F. Supp. 241, 250-52 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that the Boundary Waters Treaty does not
create private rights or permit private rights of action).
132. Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: PersonalJurisdiction over
NonresidentAlien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 45-46 (2006) (describing perception that U.S. courts are predisposed to favoring citizens over foreigners); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120,
1121-22, 1143 (1996) (exploring reasons why foreigners fear U.S. courts, but concluding,
based on empirical analysis, that foreign litigants do not fare badly in U.S. litigation); cf Eric
A. Posner & John C. Yoo, JudicialIndependence in InternationalTribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV.
1, 17 (2005) (arguing that domestic courts are subject to political control).
The perception of bias is not lost for Canadians, despite the close ties to the U.S.
See Christopher L. Doerksen, The Restatement of Canada's Cuban (American) Problem, 61
SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 127, 134 (1998) ("Canada believes that a judge raised within the
cultural construct of the United States will necessarily tend to favor U.S. interests ....
").
133. John W. Holmes, Introduction: The IJC and Canada-UnitedStates Relations, in
THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON 4 (Robert Spencer et al. eds.,
1981).
134. Id.at 5.
135. Toope & Brunne, supra note 16, at 282, 287 (arguing that the "IJC is useful and
modestly influential" and that "[tiurning it into a pseudo-judicial entity would undermine,
not enhance, its effectiveness").
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CONCLUSION

The Compact and Agreement, by many accounts, is a great step forward in state-provincial cooperation and environmental management of the
Great Lakes. The creation of private rights of action to ensure compliance
with the agreements is also remarkable. It is unfortunate, however, that the
result of the creation of a new sub-national regulatory regime may well displace the countries' reliance on the IJC. The IJC is an important institution
that has served the countries well. That it has been increasingly overlooked
in recent years is a shame. The Compact and Agreement seem to spell even
further marginalization of this venerable institution. For that reason, the
Compact and Agreement hold mixed blessings.

